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In the major continental countries of Europe, as the population ages, a
larger proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) will have to be spent
to ﬁnance pay-as-you-go systems. In Italy, which other than Germany has
the most acute expected population decline (see appendix table A.1), the
share of expenditures for the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system in relation
to GDP is expected to reach a peak of 15.8 percent in 2032 (Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2000, ﬁg. 27). This
ﬁgure holds even after the Dini and Prodi reforms, and while assuming
constant contributions (see ﬁg. 1 in this introduction). The gap between ex-
penditures and (constant) contributions and the budget deﬁcit in propor-
tion to GDP illustrated the issue of ﬁnancial viability. For Germany,1 ear-
lier estimates indicate a peak of 17 percent (OECD 1995, ﬁg. 13; these
estimates do not include the pension reform of 2001). For France, where
the population decline will be somewhat less pronounced, the Charpin
Report (Charpin 1999) expects the share of social security expenditures in
GDP to rise to 15.8 or 16.7 percent in 2040, based on two diﬀerent scenar-
ios, both assuming constant contributions.
The required contributions to a mandatory public PAYGO system place
a high burden on the young, who must also accumulate private funds for
their old age because the oﬃcial systems have lost the credibility regarding
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1. The ﬁgures for Germany exclude statutory transfers from the federal government.
9their ability to deliver their promised payments in the future. This situation
does not appear to be sustainable. The younger generation are unlikely to
be willing to give up such a large part of their income in the form of
required contributions, and they are likely to renege on their generation’s
contract. This means that the existing old age systems are not politically
viable. Moreover, the international competitiveness of jobs in countries
having large future burdens because of required contributions to pension
systems is severely aﬀected, because, with the linking of system ﬁnancing
to the work contract, labor costs will be relatively high. All this implies
that changes in the status quo are necessary.
The problem in Europe is more acute than anywhere else in the world,
except Japan. There are two reasons for this: The aging of the population
is more pronounced in Europe than elsewhere, and the welfare state has
been extended throughout Europe more than in other parts of the world.
Within Europe, the pension crisis is a continental problem; it is less a
problem for the United Kingdom (with estimated social security expendi-
tures of 6 percent of GDP by 2030; OECD 1995, ﬁg. 13). Some smaller
countries have old age assistance systems that are less prone to problems
(for example, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), whereas oth-
ers (Sweden, for example) have introduced some of the necessary changes
to their systems already. In Eastern Europe, some countries have made the
same mistakes as Western European countries, and thus are under even
greater pressure to change their systems.
In Europe, the problem of the PAYGO system is an issue not only of
ﬁnancial sustainability, but also of labor market distortions and resulting
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Fig. 1 Italy, postreform expenditures
Source: OECD (2000, Figure 27).unemployment. Contributions to the pension system have an incidence
similar to an explicit tax on labor; they weaken the demand for labor,
which in turn implies a lower net wage. Where trade unions succeed in
keeping the wage rate high, unemployment follows. The tax wedge between
the producers’ wage and the consumers’ wage diﬀers among European
countries: Contributions are low in countries using tax ﬁnance (creating
another tax wedge), but contributions paid by ﬁrms run as high as 64
percent of ﬁnancing costs in France and 80 percent in Italy. As an addi-
tional distortion, there is an implicit tax on work before retirement, espe-
cially in the age group between 58 and 65; that distortion creates an incen-
tive to retire early. This further aggravates the pension crisis.
The Illusionary Way Out: Other Avenues of Financing
As one way out of the looming crisis, European governments have at-
tempted to ﬁnd new sources of ﬁnancing their public systems without re-
ally attacking the root of the pension crisis.
Because contributions to deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) types of systems are al-
ready high and cannot be increased without major opportunity costs, one
of the practices followed is to enlarge the group required to contribute in
the hope of increasing the ﬁnancial means available—for instance, to in-
clude the self-employed. However, this forces more people into the govern-
mental system to claim beneﬁts in the future. It also means reducing the
chances for a voluntary, privately funded system (i.e., for individual [retire-
ment] saving).
In the search for new sources of ﬁnance, another option is general taxa-
tion. In this case, the future generation will have to carry the burden in
the form of taxes. However, tax ﬁnancing weakens the links between con-
tributions and beneﬁts in the pension system. It therefore represents a
larger distortion of incentives and implies a larger deadweight loss if the
given level of beneﬁts is sustained. Shifting to a tax-ﬁnanced general basic
pension system (as in Denmark) or to a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt system with ﬂat-
rate contributions (as in the United Kingdom) would imply reducing the
beneﬁt level drastically. Even if it were desirable, it would not be politi-
cally feasible.
A related approach is to introduce into the public schemes a new basic
pension for everyone, as a lower ﬂoor for old age income. Such a pension
would be ﬁnanced by general taxes. The motivation for a basic pension is
to prevent old age poverty, especially for those who have not been regu-
larly employed during their lifetimes and thus have “broken biographies.”
As discussed in Germany, this would introduce both an income ﬂoor and
means-tested social welfare beneﬁts. It could be expected to have distor-
tionary eﬀects that are stronger than those discussed for the existing
PAYGO system ﬁnanced by contributions.
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tax activities straining the environment and to use the tax receipts to ﬁ-
nance pensions, thus lowering mandatory contributions and reducing the
tax on labor. The theoretical hope is for a double dividend that could come
from reducing the tax wedge that exists because we do not pay to use the
environment. In Germany, such an ecological tax has been introduced by
the new government, although it is merely an increase in the existing oil
tax and a new tax on electricity, not a carbon dioxide emissions tax de-
signed to help solve the global warming problem. Thus, its link to the
environmental problem is weak. Moreover, the tax aﬀects productivity
negatively and lessens the competitiveness of environmentally intensive
industries when applied unilaterally by only one country. Consequently,
in Germany, exemptions were made for very pollution-intensive activities.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether a country should link the ﬁnancing
of its pension system to the receipts of taxing a factor input that must be
imported. All in all, making energy more expensive (by “fueling up for
pensions”) does not seem to be a promising way to solve the pension crisis.
The Mitigating Way Out: Changing the Supply of Labor
Another approach to mitigating the pension crisis is to change the
supply of labor eﬀectively.
Because the implicit tax on labor prior to retirement provides an incen-
tive to retire early, doing away with this tax would help reduce the magni-
tude of the pension crisis by lowering expenditures and increasing the re-
ceipts from the tax system. This implies increasing both the statutory and
the eﬀective ages of retirement, in some countries by at least ﬁve years.
Eligibility rules for early retirement would have to be tightened. In a num-
ber of countries (e.g., Germany, Italy, United Kingdom) this approach is
already being applied.
Another realistic avenue for developing new ﬁnancial proceeds for the
PAYGO system is to increase immigration. Immigration of young people
will add to the work force, and immigration of workers with high skills
will raise productivity. This will increase the base for contributions to a
pension system.
A Realistic Way Out: Reduce the Beneﬁt Level
The PAYGO system is an implicit public debt, that should be made
explicit. However, to consider explicitly the existing pension debt under an
intertemporal budget constraint is not suﬃcient to solve the pension crisis.
An automatic mechanism must be established that prevents an excessive
rise in the implicit debt. That is, the system must adjust its beneﬁts in
accordance with the intertemporal constraint. This is the most important
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tion in the beneﬁt level. Toward this end, governments so far have used an
ad hoc approach, such as increasing the period of earnings referred to in
the calculation of beneﬁts (Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands,
and Spain). Indexation rules also have been changed.2
The more systematic task, however, is to ﬁnd a formula that expresses
the intertemporal budget constraint. This requires a calculation of future
contributions to and future payments by the system, one that links beneﬁts
to contributions with some smoothing between periods. This approach ne-
cessitates a forecast of the demographic development of a country. For
instance, introducing a demographic factor for life expectancy into the
pension formula will lower the increase in pensions in an aging population.
Alternatively, a “generation factor” speciﬁc to each cohort can be selected
so that reductions will apply only to new cohorts of pensioners. Either
way, the beneﬁt level of the PAYGO system is reduced.
This approach also requires a political decision about the acceptable
level of the future burden.3 In Germany, for example, the pension reform
of 2001 reduces the beneﬁt level of the PAYGO system from 70 percent of
the previous net wage to 67 percent, while at the same time raising the
overall beneﬁt level (including private beneﬁts) to 75 percent. Thus an ag-
ing society, amazingly, ends up with a higher beneﬁt level. It is obvious that
the political process has attempted to postpone the necessary marked re-
duction of beneﬁts in the PAYGO system until far into the future.
The Attractive Way Out: Introduce a Funded Pillar
Reducing the pension level by making explicit the intertemporal budget
constraint is not an appealing political solution because it only implies that
pensioners will receive relatively less than they do today. A more appealing
political solution would also make the old age insurance system more at-
tractive. The answer, therefore, is to introduce a “funded pillar.”
There are diﬀerent ways to introduce a funded pillar (see the papers in
this volume). Although in principle it can be achieved in a centrally funded
governmental system, a privately organized system would be more robust
against political seizure (see below). The continental countries are unlikely
to switch to a completely funded system. As of now, a major shift (of, say,
20 percentage points or more) to covering a larger share of pensions will
not likely occur. In either case, a mandatory funded insurance system
would be required. Rather, the European countries probably will under-
take only a marginal shift, so that the funded private pillar will account
2. Basic beneﬁts have been made subject to an income test (Finland, Sweden; Gern 1998).
3. How far the pension will have to fall depends on the other instruments (such as increases
in contributions and in the eﬀective retirement age) being applied.
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additional private insurance, with a favorable tax treatment for contribu-
tions. Pensions then would be taxed as ordinary income. To make such in-
surance mandatory would be necessary only if a major shift occurred.
If Europe were to undertake a privately organized and funded system
only marginally, then the pension crisis would not be solved in the most
eﬀective way. Europe would not get the full premium from making the
systems more actuarially fair (Lindbeck, chap. 1 in this volume), and thus
could not reduce its costs for ﬁnancing old age pensions considerably.
Thus, it can only be hoped that the comparison between the PAYGO sys-
tem in the ﬁrst pillar and the funded system in the second pillar eventually
will prove that the funded system has higher eﬃciency. In the end, political
pressure will work in favor of a funded system.
In changing partially to a funded system, maintaining clear-cut private
property rights on the pension claims of individuals has an important ad-
vantage. For example, in the case of bankruptcy, such legally protected
accounts strengthen the interest of individuals in their pension system and
represent a safeguard against political seizure. Notional accounts within
the PAYGO system are a ﬁrst step in the direction of legally protected
claims.
There are other risks, as well: Politicians are tempted to work for the
beneﬁt of the current generation and to neglect future generations. They
may have speciﬁc groups of the electorate in mind, wanting to maximize
political support for their own parties. For instance, they might want to
ease the unemployment problem by using the revenues of the pension sys-
tem. Finally, there is another relevant risk: Funds put aside for pensions
can be used for industrial policy and for controlling the economy. At the
extreme, funding pensions thus would lead to the socialization of ﬁrms.
Privately managed occupational pension schemes may represent an-
other important avenue for helping to solve the pension crisis. In order to
prevent political inﬂuence, they must be privately managed. They cannot
be mandatory, either for ﬁrms or for employees, because they would other-
wise represent a tax on labor. Finally, portability of the claims in such
systems would have to be insured. Otherwise, labor mobility would be re-
duced.
One important aspect of shifting to a (partially) funded system is the
uncoupling of the ﬁnancing of the pension system from the work contract.5
4. Nevertheless, the intended 4 percent of the gross wage contribution in Germany (in
2008) for which favorable tax treatment is envisioned amounts to an increase in the beneﬁt
level of 8.5 percentage points of the previous wage in 2030 of the pensioners’ cohort (and to
16 percent in 2050), assuming an interest rate of 4 percent.
5. Another implicit assumption was a single earner in a family with insurance coverage
for the whole family. In this case, family breakups are a problem; furthermore, the labor
participation rate of women has risen. The issue is to what extent insurance claims must be
deﬁned for the individual.
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longer valid, however; socioeconomic change is aﬀecting the basis of the
European social insurance systems. Part-time workers are more typical;
the time proﬁle of the working life varies; and the self-employed play a
more important role than before. Income from labor is not the only source
of income, with personal wealth becoming more widespread. These sorts
of change would suggest raising the net wage by the amount that ﬁrms
pay and then giving individuals more choice in how much insurance they
want.
Two major questions for Europe are: Which role should actuarial equiv-
alence between contributions and beneﬁts play, and which weight should
be given to redistribution (from higher market income of individuals to
lower market income) within the pension system? Redistribution has dis-
torting incentive eﬀects; a stronger link between contributions and subse-
quent pensions reduces these negative incentive eﬀects and builds a strong
vested interest in a funded system. If more equivalence is accepted as the
guiding principle for the reorganization of the pension system, then distri-
butional concerns will have to be taken care of outside the pension system
by the tax-transfer mechanism (for instance, families with children may
receive a tax break). When the pension level is not satisfactory at the end
of a working life, welfare payments would ﬁll the gap.
If the income ﬂoor of social welfare beneﬁts cannot be reduced, the
scope of European governmental maneuvering to lower the basic pension
of the PAYGO system is limited. It seems diﬃcult to reduce the public
PAYGO system below the level deﬁned by social welfare payments. How-
ever, the funded portion of pensions could be organized as a mandatory
substitution for some of the current PAYGO portion.
Thus, restricting the PAYGO system in some of the European countries
is related to rearranging the income ﬂoor provided by social welfare. How-
ever, this is a highly complex issue. We might redeﬁne the criteria of eligi-
bility for social welfare, not for the elderly, but for those who are able to
work. We could reduce the beneﬁt level for them, make it more diﬃcult to
receive social welfare, or reduce their option to say “no” to jobs oﬀered.
This would have no direct eﬀect on welfare as an income ﬂoor for the
pension system, however, but it would represent a psychological redeﬁni-
tion of the income ﬂoor and thus of the income level that individuals re-
quire from the government. This could have an indirect eﬀect on behavior,
by emphasizing the importance of self-reliance in preparing ﬁnancially
for retirement.
If the income ﬂoor of social welfare beneﬁts could not be reduced, then
European governments would have only a limited space within which to
lower the basic pension under the PAYGO system. As a consequence,
there would be little room for a funded system.
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There are also some speciﬁc issues of the pension system in an increas-
ingly integrated Europe. The existing systems have developed as national
insurance schemes. They diﬀer considerably with respect to the levels of
beneﬁts, the rates of contribution, and the means of ﬁnancing (contribu-
tions versus tax ﬁnancing, and the role of funding relative to the PAYGO
system). The issue is how these national systems cope with higher labor
mobility in Europe. Moreover, national systems will be under pressure in
a single market with higher capital mobility if the labor costs they generate
impede the competitiveness of ﬁrms and reduce returns to mobile capital.
One basic question is whether membership should be mandatory, and if
so, how mandatory membership in the diﬀerent pillars should be deﬁned—
in other words, who must be a member of which system? Should member-
ship be by nationality (where one was born) or by residence (where one
works, where one lives)? Or should membership in old age insurance be
left to individual choice? This issue corresponds to the problem of how to
organize the systems.
It might be tempting to apply the country-of-origin principle (the Casis-
de-Dijon verdict of the European Court of Justice) to the ﬁrst pillar and
to give individuals a choice of which national system they wish to join;
thus national systems would compete with each other, which would put
pressure on the national systems to adjust. With noticeable diﬀerences be-
tween existing national systems, however, huge (and unpredictable) adjust-
ments would occur. It is unlikely that this approach will be taken.
The Europeanization of pension systems, that is, a harmonized Euro-
pean ﬁrst pillar, may be considered by some as part of a social union.
However, it does not appear to be realistic. It would have the severe disad-
vantage of introducing even more redistribution into the system, along
with less equivalence and a greater risk of political seizure of accounts by
a centralized Europe.
The pension system in Europe therefore must rely on the territoriality
principle (“cuius regio eius religio”) for insurance, with residency being the
criterion for membership in the ﬁrst pillar.6 To move toward a Europe-
wide system is simply not a policy option.
One practical problem that must be addressed is portability; that is,
what happens to the claims of individuals if workers switch from one na-
tional system in the ﬁrst pillar to another because of cross-border mobil-
ity? European integration implies that we must move toward portable
claims in the national systems. For example, a Belgian who has moved to
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6. This would be in line with uncoupling social insurance from the work contract. Other-
wise the workplace may be the criterion for membership.France either continues to be covered by his original Belgian insurance, or
his claim is made transferable to the French system.
The issue of portability is linked to the question of how much the
PAYGO system can be pushed back and a privately organized, funded
system introduced in its place. The more actuarial equivalence is estab-
lished, the easier it is to solve the problem of portable claims. Therefore,
the practical requirement of portability is yet another reason that it might
be necessary to introduce more actuarial equivalence and to uncouple the
ﬁnancing of old age insurance from the work contract.
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